Kenn Tomasch has already done some excellent work ^[2] on uncovering some of the reality of the 1979 players strike, in addition to correcting pundits ^[3] currently under the impression that the five day strike crippled NASL, leading to its demise.  Tomasch hints at the chaotic nature of the NASLPA labour ‘action,’ but it becomes much more apparent reading through various news articles and op-eds in Canadian newspapers from the time.  While there are striking similarities in sentiment in the current MLS labour dispute, there are major divergences in circumstance.

The players strike in late April 1979 was pushed by Ed Garvey, then executive director of the NFLPA, because NASL management refused to recognize Garvey’s NASLPA union.  In a commentary piece in the Globe and Mail (right), columnist Jeffrey Goodman intimates that management’s refusal to recognize Garvey’s NASLPA was related to the fact some in the NASL also had vested interests in the NFL—namely, Lamar Hunt—and didn’t want the same man in charge of two powerful league unions. Indeed, Derek Carroll, president of the New England Tea Men and chairman of the NASL labour relations committee, told the Associated Press that, “We are more than happy to recognize a union but we want no part of Garvey or the NFL players’ association.”

If all the NASL players and teams were American, Garvey may have had greater leverage in the work stoppage.  Yet because of the high ratio of international players in the league, plus the fact Garvey was unable to represent the then three Canadian clubs in NASL (Edmonton, Vancouver and Toronto), the five day ’strike’ quickly devolved into a complete mess involving the National Labor Relations Board, the National Immigration Service and nervous foreign players.

While players on Canadian teams could not join the strike (the teams had all filed applications months earlier for local union certification in Canada), they were encouraged by Garvey to vote on any strike action.  The Toronto Blizzard, who had been purchased by as subsidiary of the Global Television network earlier that year, initially voted for a strike action but then “unanimously voted against” striking on the verge of the stoppage, likely under pressure from senior players.  The ostensible reason for the change of heart was to prevent the newly established club from flopping in its first year, but it’s safe to say there may have been pressure to vote against from their new investors.

The lack of Canadian rationale to get behind any strike action, coupled with the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s mixed messages to foreign players—first telling international NASL players, many of whom came to earn US dollars for families back home, that under US law, playing under a strike would lead to their deportation; then effectively killing the strike by indicating it would not penalize players with valid visas prior to the work stoppage—meant a five day fiasco, with some players playing, Canadians voting for and against the strike with no real reason or effect, and many players refusing to step on pitches more out of fear of the INS than any solidarity with Garvey’s NASLPA. Garvey called the INS’ flip flop the “incredible ineptitude of the US government” and vowed to see if he could establish the NASLPA in Canada as the country “had more effective labour laws.”

In any case, the work stoppage was a complete failure.  It was much too short and chaotic as to have any real knock-on effect in the league.  Pundits on both sides of the issue hoping to use what the Toronto Star referred to as the “so-called strike” of April 1979 as a warning sign for MLS are in effect comparing apples and oranges.  Player solidarity is much more uniform in MLS than the NASL, the rules governing international players are less complex, there is no Canadian exemptions for any strike action, and the issues at stake are vastly more involved than simple union recognition. If anything, MLS could provide the sort of work stoppage that NASL thankfully avoided.

In any case, just like today, prior to Garvey’s fiasco no one had a real grasp of the likely strength or weakness of any work stoppage.  That’s where there are many similarities to the current MLS CBA talks.  Jeffrey Goodman’s 1979 pre-strike column (right) for example expresses a fear for soccer’s weak foundations that reads like many of the current blog posts on a possible MLS strike: “a strike at this point might set back immensely the plans and goals of those trying to promote the game and league, possibly ruin them for good.”